It is a very real privilege for me to be with you today to give the first of the R J L Hawke Lectures: a privilege to have been invited by this University with its proud traditions of scholarship; a privilege to be here as a member of the fourth Hawke Labor Government of Australia; and in particular a privilege to be inaugurating a Lecture named in honour of Prime Minister Bob Hawke, who has demonstrated throughout his public life how it is possible to be both passionately Australian and passionately attached to our great alliance relationship with the United States.

I think it is fair to say that no other Government in recent Australian history has had a more solid, yet at the same time clear-headed, relationship with the United States. We have been independent but close friends. We have nurtured our treaty links through difficult times. We have had moments of fierce disagreement, particularly over trade issues; but equally we have identified wide-ranging common interests, worked together to secure them, and acted together to achieve common international objectives - not least as we are now doing in the Persian Gulf.

My being with you at this University with such strong links to Lyndon Baines Johnson is in itself a reminder of the friendship between Australia and the United States. LBJ remains the only President to have visited Australia while in office, and he did so twice. Our affection for him extends equally to his widow, Lady Bird, to whom I would like to take this opportunity to convey the best wishes of her many friends in Australia.

The affection LBJ had for Australia was warmly reciprocated. We recall him not only as a President who strived throughout his public life for great humanitarian causes and a better society, but also as a Texan with characteristics of independence, directness, fortitude and earthy good humour that have a familiar resonance for Australians.

It is most appropriate, then, that the University of Texas should be the generous host for an Australian Studies Centre. It is also right that the Centre here should be named after Ambassador Ed Clark, who has been one of its prime movers - a legacy, we would like to think, of the friendship and warmth he met as the American representative in Australia during the Johnson years. Certainly Ambassador Clark is remembered with affection in Australia - not just for the yellow rose he always wore in his lapel, but as a real
embodiment of that exuberant, slightly larger than life character that we associate with the United States, and in particular this great state of Texas.

The University of Texas has, in fact, something of a tradition in matters Australian, having acquired the excellent library of that most astute American observer of Australia in earlier years, C Hartley Grattan, and housing as it does that fine collection of modern Australian painting, the Mertz Collection.

The Centre here, and that now being developed at the University of Sydney for studies of the United States, will provide, for the first time, comprehensive institutional support for Australian and American scholars wishing to expand the boundaries of our knowledge of each other. The fact that our countries are already friends makes that task of increasing mutual knowledge no less essential. For just as we have much to gain by cementing the basis of that friendship, so we have much to lose by taking each other for granted.

Notwithstanding all the shared cultural symbols, there are still huge gaps in our knowledge of each other's society. For Australians, the challenge is, at the very least, to penetrate the global avalanche of simplistic popular images of American culture and to come to grips with the real flesh and blood - the human complexities and competitive pressures which make the American polity such a vigorous and fertile one. For Americans, nurtured on a profound belief in the intrinsic and unique virtues of American society and in America's democracy - a belief for which history has in this century given plenty of reinforcement - it calls for an often difficult leap of imagination to understand, simply, what it is to be non-American, and to accept wholeheartedly the legitimacy of non-American interests and the value of friends who are true to themselves.

I particularly welcome in this respect the fact that the Australian Studies Centre will offer academic study at both graduate and undergraduate levels. This will fill a significant gap in American education about Australia. Henceforth the teachers, businessmen and women, academics and public officials of the future - all the students who go from this Centre to forge their career in any number of fields - will have been exposed to a vigorous and informed exposition of Australia and of Australian society.

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In developing a theme to talk to you about tonight, I have been mindful in particular of two sets of circumstances. The first is that this Centre, here in the American heartland, is - as I have been saying - essentially about nurturing a relationship between two allies. Texas's LBJ put a special store by friendships, loyalties and alliances, as do those other great Texans now in Washington, President George Bush and my colleague and friend Secretary James Baker - and as do we in Australia.
The second set of circumstances is simply the times in which we live. The comprehensive international response to the challenge of Iraq's aggression - involving unprecedented cooperation in the United Nations, and outside it, between the United States and the Soviet Union - reminds us that the world has changed fundamentally over the last two years. We stand at an historic watershed, with an old order having disappeared and a new one in the process of being established.

The question arises, against the background of this dramatically different international environment, as to just what will be the place of those alliances - ours included - with which we have been so comfortably familiar. Where do they fit? How have they been relevant, if at all, to the extraordinary process of change we have been living through? How will they be relevant, if at all, in the new world order that does seem to be coming into being?

Alliances - for good or ill - have been a feature of the dealings between nation states for as long as nation states have existed - from the conquests of Charlemagne or Napoleon, to the fall of the Roman Empire or the Third Reich; from the rise of Ancient Babylon to - we would all hope - the fall, or at least retreat, of Saddam Hussein's modern Babylon.

Alliances have always been, more than anything else, about territory and wealth, and the power to defend it or acquire it. They are predicated essentially on the basis that the security of a nation, like the security of an individual, more often than not depends on partnership or membership of a group; that there is strength in numbers; that successful defence often involves the assistance of those who might also be threatened or for whom one's own survival is an asset; and that in confronting an enemy, it is useful to look to those who also regard him with disfavour, fear or greed.

Alliances are based on the concept of acting in the common interest, of bringing common assets to bear, against a common enemy or potential enemy. This may be in terms of attack or defence; of acquisition of territory or its retention; of dis-equilibrium of power, or balance of power. Alliances can be healthy and relatively equal, based on genuine mutual values and interests, as has largely been the case with Western alliances since World War Two. They can also be unhealthy and unequal, based on fear - as was demonstrated in Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968.

Alliances derive from a world divided into friends and adversaries. Weaker countries strengthen their security by entering an alliance with a stronger third party, directed against an adversary. For the more powerful partner there can also be persuasive benefits. The alliance can provide the senior member with the means to influence the actions of the junior, to constrain rogue behaviour, and thus improve its capacity to manage its own overall security environment - all of which can help to stabilise adversarial power relationships.
Not all alliances do contribute to stability and security. Some are volatile and ephemeral, as has so often been the case in the Middle East. They do little to promote stability, being premised principally on the adage "the enemy of my enemy is my friend", or - in the Bedouin Arabic proverb - "Me and my brother against our cousin. Me, my brother and my cousin against the stranger". Some alliances simply spawn counter-alliances and spread inevitable conflict wider. But in many other cases, because countries have formed defensive alliances, adversarial power relationships have been stabilised and prevented from deteriorating into aggression. It was, after all, the alliance structure that largely maintained peace in Europe from the end of the Franco-Prussian War until the Great War - although one can argue that by 1914, with the chain reaction that followed Sarajevo, it was an alliance structure that had outlived its usefulness that finally precipitated World War I.

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Whatever may have been the case in the lead-up to World War I, after World War II it seemed both that alliances were here to stay and that they were unquestionably a force for stability. Whether we find it comfortable to acknowledge it or not, the maintenance of two enormously powerful blocs facing each other across Europe and the North Atlantic since 1945 did operate to prevent the threat of global warfare from being realised: the opposing alliances created a balance, with their huge arsenals of nuclear weapons constituting a terrifying but effective mutual deterrent.

The alliances also created a certain discipline which prevented tensions from boiling over in a way which might have occurred in the absence of such structures. In this sense, too, NATO - and in its own way the Warsaw Pact - were stabilising factors in international relations. With NATO, genuine common interests amongst the membership, and acceptance of American leadership, maintained that essential element of a stable alliance, namely unity of purpose. The case of the Warsaw Pact was more ambiguous, in the sense that it was imposed by one member on the others. It lacked the essential cement so obvious in NATO - agreement on common political values - and it was no coincidence that when the moving power behind the Warsaw Pact made clear it could not and would not impose its will on them, the Pact disintegrated because it had nothing left to hold it together.

But if stability has been the main advantage of the post-War system, it has been stability at a price - and I do not mean just the psychological price of living with the knowledge, as we have now for nearly two generations, that miscalculation by our political leaders could result in the annihilation of all humanity.

In the first place, there has been the enormous price of the ever-spiralling arms race generated by the Cold War: hundreds of billions of dollars of resources which could have
been put to other use. Both sides built higher and higher walls of more and more sophisticated offensive and defensive weaponry, short-changing the demands of economic development both within their own frontiers and in other countries around the world.

And secondly, there has been the price paid in negating the collective security functions of the United Nations. In the first four decades of its life, many attempts were made to give the UN security teeth. With the fortuitous exception of Korea, and a handful of other much smaller and less controversial peace-keeping operations, those attempts conspicuously and comprehensively failed, with the UN becoming far more often a forum for East-West confrontation than for cooperation and the resolution of conflict. The United Nations was placed in the strait-jacket of East-West confrontation, with a Security Council veto by one side or other being about the only certainty when the UN was called upon to act.

Much of the East-West tension contained in Europe was unleashed elsewhere in regional conflicts, often of terrifying intensity. Sometimes stoked by the opposing alliances and sometimes amounting to proxy wars, these conflicts stimulated endless human misery - which the United Nations was created to seek to alleviate. There are some who yearn for the certainties of the Cold War era. They would do well to reflect that the benefits of stability were distributed far from equally.

The Cold War is now for all practical purposes over, and a wholly new approach to guaranteeing global security is emerging. East-West strategic competition is no longer the touchstone of international relations; cooperation is replacing confrontation as the leitmotif. Significant new arms control and disarmament measures are coming to fruition, with each building upon the last and the pace accelerating. The vicious circle of the nuclear arms race is breaking: for the first time in the nuclear age, we have the prospect of replacing a vicious circle with a virtuous circle, where confidence builds on itself, cooperation extends and security is strengthened.

All this represents the coming of age of a concept which seemed visionary, maybe even fantastical, when it was articulated by a group of statesmen from many continents under the leadership of the late Swedish Prime Minister, Olof Palme, in 1982. This is the concept of "common security" - the notion that lasting security does not lie in an upwards spiral of arms development, fuelled by mutual suspicion, but in a commitment to joint survival, to taking into account the legitimate security anxieties of others, to building step-by-step military confidence between nations, to working to maximise the degree of interdependence between nations - to achieving security with others, not against them.

Nothing in the idea of common security implies passivity or appeasement in the face of a security threat. We are not talking about emasculating our military forces. We are not talking about removing our capability to respond to direct threat to our nation or, as is the
case in the Gulf, a threat to the international security framework. Rather, common security implies an understanding that while each country has to responsibly assess and meet its own legitimate security needs, it also has to avoid - to the extent possible - generating, through its own actions, security anxieties and military reactions on the part of other countries. As confidence builds in this way, the upwards spiral of arms competition can rapidly be translated into the downwards spiral of arms reduction that we now see well and truly under way in Europe and the North Atlantic, with massively favourable consequences for the peace of the world in the process.

What has been and what will be the role of alliances in all of this? On the face of it, it might be thought that alliances have outlived their usefulness - that in the emerging world of common security everyone can have confidence that security will be maintained without the need for elaborate, competing and balancing international power blocs.

But it would be more than a little naive to make that assumption just yet. Even if, in these startling times, we are contemplating with equanimity a Soviet President addressing NATO and being prepared to live with the former East Germany joining that organisation, and even if new forums like the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), embracing both the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries and others as well, are operating more constructively than anyone could have believed possible even two years ago, the global security millenium has not yet arrived. Until we are very much closer to achieving a world in which threats to global security are wholly eliminated, alliances will go on playing significant roles in international relations in at least two respects.

The first is as a transition mechanism - actually keeping the process of confidence building, and common security building, moving forward. The NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances have not themselves been the driving forces toward the end of the Cold War: the stimulus for that came from the imminent economic collapse of the Soviet superpower under the weight of its own internal contradictions. But they have been important in the management of the transition. It requires a good deal of confidence to move from an upwardly spiralling arms race to a downwardly spiralling process of arms reduction, and the existing alliance networks were crucial to the superpowers having that sense of confidence.

The Warsaw Pact provided the USSR with a formal security structure which enabled it to allay some of its security concerns while beginning the business of domestic reform. And during the months of the rapid departure of the Eastern Europeans from Soviet tutelage, the Pact - the retention of which the Soviets seemed to regard as more important than almost anything else - provided a form of cover within which the USSR could establish understandings with NATO about the shape of the new Europe and, essentially, its own security. NATO was always inherently stronger than the Warsaw Pact, and the West has in any event had nothing like the same agony of self-doubt as the new security order in Europe has started falling into place, but it is worth acknowledging the institutional role
that NATO has played in coordinating and advancing the Western response. In the process NATO has been visibly undergoing a transition, by no means yet complete, from a military alliance - against a clearly perceived military threat - to a more political organisation, albeit one with a continuing military defence role and some new military-related roles, for example in arms control verification. But an alliance NATO still remains, and it is as an alliance that it is helping construct the new security architecture.

The second role that alliances can and will play for a long time yet in the global context is as a fail-safe mechanism. History almost certainly has some aces up her sleeve: her hand is not played out yet. Conflict still persists at the regional level, and some of it has explosive potential globally. We still cannot be confident that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds. In particular, we still live in a world where, for all the change in atmosphere and for all the disarmament progress that has already been made, there are still in existence some 50,000 nuclear warheads with a destructive capacity of nearly 16,000 megatons - equivalent of 3.3 tons of TNT for every man, woman and child on earth or, to put it another way, 800,000 times the force of the bomb which destroyed Hiroshima.

With arsenals like this still in existence and their elimination still a long way away, and with all the uncertainty that presently prevails about the future course of events in the Soviet Union, quite apart from those countries with nuclear proliferation potential, it is not an unnecessary luxury, but a necessity, to stay on one's guard. It is in this context that, for example, satellite ground stations with unique early warning and verification functions - of the kind that Australia provides in its Joint Facilities with the United States in Central Australia - will go on being important for a long time yet.

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The continuing role and utility of alliance relationships is clearer still when one moves from a global to a specifically regional focus.

I have suggested that one of the disadvantages of the old bipolar security order was that there was little capacity to resolve regional crises outside the NATO/Warsaw Pact theatre, not least because in such situations the United Nations mechanism almost invariably deadlocked. The balance of deterrence was successfully maintained in the central Europe-North Atlantic theatre, but at the cost of a gradually increasing extension of both sides' military reach. In this situation almost every regional conflict anywhere in the world, whatever its local origins, was overlaid with a Cold War dimension. Such conflicts were inherently very difficult to solve, because of the opposing interests and prestige of the two nuclear superpowers being engaged on opposing sides. Indeed, had the Gulf crisis occurred during the Cold War, we can reasonably assume that the superpowers would be on a high state of nuclear alert, and we could now be living through a superpower crisis of the proportions of the Cuban missile crisis.
We have now moved into a vastly different situation, one of the most encouraging features of which is a new capacity to deal with regional crises in a way which was previously denied. The Gulf crisis is the first major test of the new world order, and it is a test that the world cannot afford to fail. It will provide an example and set the tone for the future. If the international community handles the crisis well, the demonstration effect will weigh heavily on those nations which might in the future be tempted to settle disagreements by intimidation and aggression; if we fumble and hesitate, content ourselves with declarations that have no effect and UN resolutions that are not enforced, the demonstration effect will be equally convincing in its message that the international community is powerless to enforce judgments that we all know to be just.

The response to the Gulf crisis has of course transcended traditional alliance relationships. The Soviet Union has been supportive throughout; there has been a conspicuous degree of solidarity from a clear majority of Arab States; and there is no discernible support for Saddam Hussein anywhere in Asia, especially not in those many countries whose nationals have been among the sea of people impoverished and displaced by the crisis. But for all that, one of the most fascinating features of the crisis has been the very high - indeed disproportionate - degree of solidarity and support the US has received from its traditional allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific.

There was a fast and timely response from Europe - through NATO and the recently remobilised Western European Union - to the US and Kuwaiti call for participation in the multinational naval force, and subsequently to the US and Saudi call for help with land forces. Canada also joined in, and Australia, I am pleased to say, was one of the very first countries to commit naval ships to sanctions enforcement: the fact that we did so from our distant corner of the world was useful proof in itself of the genuinely global nature of the reaction to Saddam Hussein. Elsewhere in the Pacific, the Republic of Korea was the first country to offer transport services to the US and multilateral Arab forces opposing Iraq, and Japan - while constitutional and political constraints have inhibited a specifically military contribution - has been helpful in its financial support.

It cannot of course be assumed that the Gulf crisis is the last major regional crisis with which the world will have to deal. Regrettably, as Francis Fukuyama has recently observed, "pure power politics continues to characterise the behaviour of many ... states with strong hormones and weak foresight". Moreover, while Fukuyama also notes, intriguingly, that in the two hundred years or so that modern liberal democracies have existed, there is not a single instance of one liberal democracy fighting another, there are still not enough unqualified liberal democracies among the significant countries of the world to give us any confidence that, even if this record can be maintained, war and conflict are now things of the past.

Naturally the area of the globe that preoccupies Australia most in this respect is the Asia-
Pacific region, and this is no less a focus for the United States in its capacity as a Pacific as well as a global power. In many ways the situation in this region is much more fluid and complex than that in the Europe-North Atlantic theatre. Asia is a diverse and non-homogeneous region, with little of the sense of common cultural identity and common diplomatic tradition of Europe. There are many different issues of contention and many different "fronts", unlike Europe where there has been a single East-West conflict. There is a Western alliance system in the Western Pacific Rim - with Japan and Australia as its northern and southern anchors respectively - but it operates quite differently from Europe. Unlike the NATO system, the Western alliance in our region operates through a series of essentially bilateral alliances with the United States - the US-Japan Security Treaty, the US-Australian Alliance (including, but not limited to, the ANZUS Treaty), and the US defence arrangements with the Republic of Korea, the Philippines and so on.

It cannot be assumed, against this background, that the global relaxation of tension will necessarily in itself lead to improved security in the Asia-Pacific region. As US-Soviet bipolar competition eases in the region, the interests and military capabilities of other major regional actors (China, India and Japan in particular) become more prominent. New strategic uncertainties may thus emerge, with a risk of generating new regional arms races.

In Australia's judgment this situation calls, here as in Europe, for a common security approach with countries working to build multidimensional linkages of mutual benefit and interdependence, between old adversaries as well as between old friends. In the early stages, a sub-regional building block approach to security dialogue may be more effective than a region-wide approach. Australia's interests are mainly focused on contributing to such dialogues around South East Asia and the South Pacific, although we also have a natural interest in security dialogues in North East Asia and the North Pacific.

While it is quite premature at this stage to contemplate any kind of specific new security architecture for Asia or the Asia-Pacific, it may be that one day some kind of all-embracing Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia - built in some way on the still-evolving Helsinki CSCE model in Europe - will be seen as timely and appropriate. If it should be, it will be because a process of dialogue has begun to build confidence, and patterns of cooperation, around the Asia-Pacific region. If such a process is pursued, sooner or later a base will emerge on which more systematic security architecture can be built.

Central to my argument today is the point that as we move towards a common security approach in the Asia Pacific region the present framework of United States alliances in the region can and should remain, for the foreseeable future, as a solid base for that transition. In the Asia Pacific, even more so than in Europe, countries need the reassurance of these established alliances as they address the new policy questions. The need for fail-safe mechanisms is even greater in Asia than in Europe, because of the many questions and apprehensions that an uncontrolled movement to multipolarity would otherwise generate.
support Dick Cheney's thought, expressed recently in Tokyo, that the US defence presence in Asia, supported by its various alliances, operates as a "balancing wheel" as regional countries gradually adjust to the changing security environment. And we in Australia are glad, as are other countries in Asia, that the foreshadowed reduction over time in the US military presence in Asia will be gradual, predictable, and subject to review as it proceeds.

We are also glad that the United States is now moving to a higher level of diplomatic activity in the discussion of common security approaches in the Asia Pacific region. The recent Baker/Shevardnadze discussions in Irkutsk were important in this respect. There were also the US decisions this year to support an expanding relationship between South Korea and the USSR, and to open US dialogue with Vietnam and the Hun Sen regime in Cambodia - which gave them new confidence to engage in the settlement process. The US negotiations with the Philippines on the future of the bases are now more firmly based on developing an agreed concept of regional security.

In this process of change, the healthy US alliances with Japan and Australia - the northern and southern anchors, as I have said, of the US strategic engagement in Asia - have a particular importance. In Australia's case, this is a role with which we feel comfortable. I want to stress here that there is no conflict whatever between Australia's regional security approach and our firm alliance relationship with the United States. Indeed, for the Asia Pacific dialogue to make real progress, it is essential that the United States and Japan engage themselves fully. Just as the United States played a leadership role in the evolution of new common security approaches in Europe, its stance will significantly affect the prospects for similar positive changes in the Asia-Pacific region.

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I have been speaking about the general role of alliances, and their place in ensuring global security and regional security. I would like to conclude by addressing one large remaining question: what it takes to maintain a healthy alliance in a changing world. You may not be surprised that I take as my model the very healthy alliance that exists, as it has now existed in one form or another since the Second World War, between Australia and the United States.

A healthy alliance, in my judgment, is not one that involves what is often called, in the rhetoric of international relations, a "special relationship". Special relationships suggest free rides, and free rides, like free lunches, don't exist. Special relationships have a cost, tending to involve as they do an unhealthy dependence of one partner on another. Special relationships can be an excuse for not having a foreign policy, an invitation to laziness and - at the worst - to lack of integrity in foreign policy, with hard-headed assessments of national interest giving way to indolent fellow-travelling. Far more important than a "special" relationship is a mature relationship, one embodying genuinely mutual interests,
one with some real breadth and depth and complexity to it, and one which fully recognizes
that alliance membership and sovereign independence, whatever the relative size and clout
of the alliance partners, are not incompatible statuses.

What Australia now has with the United States is not just a military alliance, but a
relationship of real substance, embracing ties of history, commerce and culture, and a
profound mutual interest in maintaining a strong American presence globally and within
our region. That the alliance does give expression to mutual interests needs to be clearly
understood, because that mutuality lies at the heart of its durability. These interests extend
across security issues, economic issues and multilateral or global issues, and it is worth
looking at the ledger of benefits, in each of these areas in turn, in order to appreciate what
both sides gain from the relationship.

First, security. For Australia, our alliance does not absolve us of the responsibility of
defending ourselves, of pulling our own weight in our own protection or from seeking to
make our own contribution to multilateral efforts to resolve particular regional security
concerns - such as we have done with our Cambodia initiative and with our contribution to
the Persian Gulf. Australia's defence policy of self-reliance enables us to defend ourselves
from within our own resources, and also provides us with the capacity to contribute
directly to the maintenance of regional security. But it is self-reliance within an alliance
framework - and that framework is very important to our security, not only because of the
deterrent value of the ANZUS alliance, but because without the exchange of intelligence,
and the technology, resupply and training support that it involves, Australia would find it
difficult to sustain a basic defence posture quite as self-reliant as we would like it to be.

The security value of the alliance flows in both directions. The United States has its own
substantial security interests in the Asia Pacific region, and these are served through an
alliance with a country in the unique geographic position of straddling both the Pacific
and the Indian Oceans. We have worked together effectively in the resolution of regional
security conflicts of potentially global significance - most recently, and most importantly,
in crafting a settlement to end the tragic conflict in Cambodia. We offer the United States
access to our airfields and to ports in both oceans - access which is important in sustaining
the US global role, (although I would not go as far as former US National Security
Adviser Brzezinski who in a speech in Melbourne in 1988, after describing our geography
in terms similar to mine, described Australia as the "Oceanic Geo-Strategic Control
Centre"!). In the larger global context, moreover, we make a distinctive contribution to the
United States defence posture, and through that to global stability, by operating with the
United States a number of Joint Facilities in Australia, most importantly those I have
already mentioned in Central Australia, at Pine Gap and Nurrungar.

In economic terms, our trade relationship with the United States continues to be vital for
Australia. The United States is Australia's second largest trading partner, supplying over
20 per cent of our imports and taking over 10 per cent of our exports. The Australian
market is less important to the United States, but not unimportant. In fact, we are the United States' eleventh largest export market, and the US has a two to one trade balance in favour with Australia - something not to be sneezed at these days.

Thirdly, Australia and the United States work together effectively on an enormous range of multilateral issues: security efforts like control of nuclear and chemical weapons; multilateral economic efforts like the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and the establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process; work on human rights; on the environment; efforts to combat narcotics and to halt the ravages of underdevelopment, hunger and disease.

It will be evident from all of this that Australia and the United States have similar approaches to, and have devoted cooperative energies to, a great many international political and security issues, and economic and other international issues. But it should not go unremarked that in recent years we have also had differences of view. The most important of these have been economic: decisions made in Washington on issues such as export subsidies for wheat, various restrictions on agricultural imports of sugar and beef, so-called Voluntary Restraint Arrangements on steel, and difficulties from time to time with uranium, have all caused a good deal of hurt on our side of the Pacific.

We have also had differences from time to time on such political and security issues as the Strategic Defence Initiative, sanctions against South Africa, ratification of the Geneva Protocol on the rules of war, some Middle Eastern and Central American questions, aspects of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Treaty, and on the urgency of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. And in the "third agenda" area, we have continuing lively exchanges on such issues as the protection of the Antarctic environment, and the repatriation of Indo-Chinese refugees.

In citing these examples, I do not wish to be taken as suggesting that the measure of independence in an alliance relationship is the number of disagreements. The point is that, whether or not we come out in agreement or in disagreement with the United States on any particular issue, we do so on the basis of an independent Australian judgment. A healthy alliance, as ours most assuredly is, not only accommodates independence of this kind, but demands it. Our alliance is as relevant as it ever was, as the world changes around us. It is ever more multidimensional in character; it is frank and robust when it needs to be; and it is totally mutually supportive when it needs to be. In this sense, ours is not only an alliance of democracies, but also a thoroughly democratic alliance.

I have said much tonight about security, change, alliances and partnership. But in the final analysis the strength of our own relationship, of its durability and of its capacity to adapt to changing circumstances, relies on shared interests. A nation's interests and the direction of its foreign and defence policies, in pursuit of those interests, depend on the instincts,
outlook and values of its people - what they believe in. Ultimately it is because Australians and Americans believe in the same things - democracy, freedom and human rights - that our alliance relationship will endure, will adapt and will go on contributing to the building of a safer and fairer world.