GLOBAL MORALITY THROUGH COOPERATIVE SECURITY

Edited transcript of an Address by Senator the Hon Gareth Evans QC, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Medical Association for the Prevention of War Conference, Hahndorf, South Australia, 11 March 1994

In the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, there are around forty people who are specifically equipped and tasked to analyse potential conflicts and, if necessary, play some kind of mediating or conciliatory role to help resolve them. And they are the only people in the UN system with that kind of capacity. If we were to expand that capacity by another 100 people and to locate them in a series of regional Peace and Security Resource Centres in various key locations around the globe, that kind of effort could be put in place at a cost of about $US21 million.

Also within the US system in the last year, we have had something like 82,000 military personnel engaged in peace-keeping or similar operations in multiple locations around the globe. The cost in the last year to the UN system and member states of those peace keeping exercises - mopping-up after conflicts of one kind or another, seeking to resolve already serious situations, or seeking to ensure that already serious situations do not deteriorate further - has been, of the order of $US3.7 billion.

When the Gulf war was waged in 1991, employing as it did scores of thousands of military personnel, transported rapidly, with a mass of equipment to go with them, from all around the globe, the cost of waging that war - which lasted just 6 weeks - was some $US70 billion.

I think there is a message clearly evident when one compares those three figures - $21 million, $3.7 billion and $70 billion - and when one compares the number of personnel that the international community, through the United Nations, has been prepared to deploy respectively for prevention, post-conflict management and actual military peace enforcement. It is a message that the international community, however, still seems somewhat reluctant to learn, or even think about, in terms of changing the way things work. But it is a message that I believe really does need to be heeded and absorbed, particularly in the kind of security environment we now confront in the post-Cold War world. Although the great achievement of the end of the Cold War has been to remove, for the foreseeable future, the imminent threat of nuclear catastrophe that we have lived with for the last fifty years, none of us can confidently say...
that the environment thus created is one in which conflict, death and destruction are permanently behind us.

The gridlock that kept a large number of conflicts either entirely suppressed or, if they did occur, occurring only on a quite small scale, was lifted by the end of the Cold War. The capacity of the United States and the Soviet Union between them to lock in a very large number of client countries - who were dominated and directed by the respective superpowers and would not have dreamed of taking unilateral action without at least a nod of acquiescence from their patron - disappeared with the lifting of the gridlock, and one of the first fruits of that was, of course, the outrageous adventurism on which Iraq embarked in the Gulf against Kuwait. We have to expect that from time to time, because the habits of millennia unfortunately don't change: rogue states will be tempted to do roguish things. Moreover, in the aftermath of the Cold War, with greater freedom of action for many states, we are beginning to see quite a lot of manoeuvring going on, mainly taking the form of economic positioning at this stage, but with a military dimension to it, in terms of modernisation of forces, in many cases. A number of countries are looking about and stretching their wings a little, contemplating what the order of things might be in the future: this is as true in the Asia Pacific as it is anywhere else, even though the overall security atmosphere is quite benign in our own region at the moment. There is presently no particular cause for alarm in this phenomenon, but nonetheless a degree of fluidity about the security situation in a number of parts of the world which does need to be taken into account when we are contemplating, as an international community, how we are to cope with the new post-Cold War reality.

One further phenomenon really has burst out since the end of the Cold War - the resurgence of ethno-nationalism, with individual ethnic groups within previously established states also stretching their wings, in some cases in very violent ways, catching up whole regions in conflicts of an often quite hideous kind as a result. There are many tensions of that type still unresolved in many parts of the world, and dealing with this phenomenon is one of the greatest difficulties that we confront in the post-Cold War era. In addition there are all the too unhappily familiar problems of natural disasters - drought, earthquakes, typhoons and the like - which can place enormous stresses and strains on particular states where infrastructure is not well developed. Along with other more human factors, these problems can lead to the emergence of broken-backed states like Somalia, which can create, in turn, yet more kinds of security issues with which the international community has to deal.

Confronted with this kind of reality, there is an acute need for the international community to think systematically, carefully, and thoughtfully about how to respond. And it is a matter of responsibility for the international community. The handling of this kind of situation is not something that can be left to individual great and powerful states. Even countries like the United States, which might have the capacity to play the role of world policemen these days - and it is probably only the United States that comes anywhere near to having the global reach, authority and resources to do so - simply cannot summon the will to play that role. This is not least because of the reaction of domestic
constituencies that are always heard to argue that their country should not be getting caught up - and their citizens should not be getting killed - in other people's conflicts, or in dealing with other people's problems. If these sorts of problems are to be addressed by other than neglect, then there has to be a genuinely multilateral, international response.

Although there are a number of regional organisations that might have a role in developing responses of this kind, overwhelmingly the responsibility falls on the United Nations, the only organisation with effectively universal membership among the nations of the world, and the only one with the formal capacity in its Charter to engage in the full range of responses to security situations as they arise. If the United Nations did not exist, it would be necessary to invent it, just as it was necessary to reinvent the League of Nations, in the form of the United Nations, after the League collapsed in the 1930s. But to acknowledge the existence of the UN and of a potential role for it, is not in itself to answer the questions that need to be answered now, about what kind of a role the UN should be playing and is capable of playing.

With the end of the Cold War, expectations were enormous as to the capacity of the UN system to deliver peace, stability, security, and where necessary, intervention and involvement. To some extent, those expectations had been realised in two extremely complex peace keeping operations, in Namibia and more recently in Cambodia. The United Nations did, against considerable odds, succeed in doing what could not have been done through any other mechanism. But not everything has been a success story: in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, just about everything that could have gone wrong has gone wrong at some point or another. As a result, we have seen, in the international community and in individual countries, a big reaction against all those original expectations of the UN that were held just four or five years ago. The pendulum has swung right the other way, and there is an enormous degree of cynicism and disillusionment with the United Nations in many important countries - most spectacularly in the United States itself, if not so much in the Administration then certainly in Congress. And therein lie real problems, not least in the financial obligations of the United States, which are Congress-dependent.

I think the pendulum has swung much too far now in a negative direction. The job of those of us in the international community who care about these things is to try and somehow get expectations and realities back into balance and to identify what the art of the possible actually now is - and then to get on with the job of implementing it!

That is the reason why, last year, I embarked - with the help of a lot of very good people from my Department, the ANU, and elsewhere - on the task of writing the 'Blue Book', Cooperating for Peace. This was designed to be an Australian contribution to the debate on the future role of the United Nations that was stimulated by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in his own initial report, Agenda for Peace, published a few months earlier. The focus is on the peace and security role of the United Nations: I do not try to deal with the UN's economic and social agenda - although there
is some emphasis on the cross-roads, or joining point, between the peace and security preoccupations of the UN and the economic and social ones, with the point being made that security is multi-dimensional in character and dependent on getting not just the politico-military aspects right, but also infrastructure, development and related issues.

On the UN's peace and security role, what I have sought to do is essentially three things: first, try and get the conceptual debate back into shape by identifying, with a little more precision than has been common in international dialogue, just what we should be meaning when we talk about the different kinds of problems that the UN should be willing to address in the security area, and what kinds of responses - peace making, peace enforcement and so on - that it is appropriate to deploy in response to those problems. The objective was to try and avoid, in other words, some of the rampant confusion that exists in a lot of the debate on all this which is a very serious inhibitor to systematic and thoughtful consideration of these issues, with people talking across each other and using the same words to mean different things. The second objective was to try and define, with quite a bit of precision, the criteria that ought to be applied by decision-makers when confronting situations that seem to cry out for some degree of UN involvement: what should be the conditions, the circumstances which one should take into account when one is embarking on a peace keeping operation; what should be the criteria that should determine whether or not you up the ante and move into a full scale aggressive military peace enforcement operation; and so on. The third major thing I wanted to do in this book was map, at least in outline, the major organisational changes which are necessary in the UN system if it is to be much more effectively responsive to this whole range of problems.

As to the kinds of problems that are prima facie appropriate for UN or other international security involvement, I describe four different categories: emerging threats; disputes, which are disagreements falling short of armed conflict; conflicts, which involve disagreements or disputes that have actually crossed the threshold into armed hostilities of one kind or another; and a residual category of "other major security crises", life-threatening crises of the kind that have been seen by the international community as justifying some security-related response.

Just as the problems themselves range on a continuum from (more manageable) emerging threats, through (more and more worrying) disputes and conflicts, so too is there, in our analysis, a graduated progression of appropriate responses which the international community should think about deploying when facing those different kinds of problems. The four categories of response that we identify are peace building, peace maintaining, peace restoring and peace enforcing.

Peace building is a concept which hitherto has been used, for example by the Secretary-General of the UN, only in a very limited kind of way, to refer to rehabilitation and reconstruction after a major conflict has occurred. Cambodia is a clear example of such post-conflict peace building, with resources put into, for example, mine clearance, developmental activity and government-building. But I also use the concept of peace building in a much more broad-
ranging way to describe a whole series of strategies which are appropriate to deploy in a preventive way to ensure that, in a whole number of different ways, disputes and conflicts do not even get started.

Peace building involves two quite different sorts of activity. One is putting in place international regimes of one kind or another: for example, disarmament and arms control regimes or regimes related to the law of the sea designed to set ground rules and avoid maritime conflicts breaking out. The other broad category of peace building activity might be called in-country peace building: this involves a whole variety of strategies aimed at creating conditions in particular countries which will make much less likely the prospect of disputes and conflicts breaking out: a kind of assistance that is becoming increasingly common these days is one designed not just to focus on development of economic activity, but the strengthening of governmental institutions and creating better governance in countries. Also involved here are human rights strategies designed to improve the position of minority groups and so on, so that some of these ethno-nationalist tensions don't break out in the form of violent efforts to secure self determination by conflictual means.

When we talk about peace maintaining, the basic focus is on preventive diplomacy (although there is another notion gaining increasing currency also under this heading these days, preventive deployment - the sort of thing that has been done in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with American troops going in there as a deterrent presence against the possibility of a spillover of the conflicts in Bosnia and places north). Preventive diplomacy involves mobilising those resources I began by talking about - expertise in conflict resolution, with people of international standing and the capability to undertake mediation, conciliation, and generally assist in a whole variety of ways to ensure, preferably earlier rather than later, that disputes or disagreements that exist around the world do not escalate and spill over into the terrain of armed hostilities. The book places a good deal of emphasis on arguing that the international system should be doing very much more than it is at the moment to enhance that capability.

Then we get to the area of peace restoring - what you do when you have actually got a conflict situation, when armed hostilities have broken out: how do you go about correcting that situation? There are two strategies involved: one is peace making, the other is peace keeping. Peace making is essentially diplomatic and related activity, exactly the same sort of things you do when you engage in preventive diplomacy, but after a conflict has broken out. One kind of peace making is encouraging parties to embrace a ceasefire after they have been shooting at each other. More complex peace making activity is when you are trying to get the parties not merely to stop shooting, but to reach agreement about the whole strategy for transition back to peaceful, secure, stable government. Cambodia is a very good example of a peace making exercise that went on over a number of years, culminating in the Paris Conference where a whole group of countries, as well as the internal players, got together and agreed upon a very complex peace blueprint. Sometimes the expression "peace making" is used as a synonym for actual military enforcement activity, on the same principle, I
suppose, as in old western movies - Colt .45s were called peace makers. But I regard that as a most unhappy analogy from a whole variety of terminological points of view, and I think it ought to be avoided.

The other side of the peace restoring coin is peace keeping. When you have your blueprint in place, when you have your agreement - whether it is about something relatively small and simple like a ceasefire, or whether it is about something much more complex like a whole transition back to normality strategy - you need someone to monitor, to supervise, to oversee that process, to conduct elections perhaps, to operate the rudiments of a transitional government process to fill the vacuums that might otherwise exist. And that is classic peace keeping activity. It may take a very simple form, as in Cyprus where you have just a thin blue line separating, for many years now, the Turkish-Cypriots from the Greek Cypriots, but nothing much else happening; or an extremely complicated operation of the kind you had in Namibia and Cambodia.

The final broad category is peace enforcement. That can operate either in a non-military way, through the application of sanctions, or it can operate militarily. A classic example of peace enforcement was the Gulf War. Peace enforcement involves resolving conflict in a situation where the parties have not agreed, are unlikely to agree and in fact are behaving very badly (or at least one side is) in a situation where the international community is prepared to respond collectively and get in there and do the job. Obviously it is a remedy to be avoided if at all possible, not least because it costs so much, not only in dollars but in human lives and misery.

There, in a nutshell, are the basic concepts. Although a great deal of this will appear very familiar, there is still an enormous amount of confusion in the literature, and in the way in which people actually talk to each other - including around the Security Council table in New York - about these sorts of issues. Mapping them, and getting some degree of conceptual clarity here is, I think, a task worth embarking upon.

As to criteria: let me simply try and summarise a lot of pages - indeed chapters - of discussion packed into my book, in a few sentences. Although the relevant criteria are quite complicated, and vary according to the different degree of intensity of involvement you are contemplating, it really all comes down to about four basic points. One is that there should be clear and achievable goals. Secondly, there should be the appropriate kind of support for the operation in question: in other words, if you are talking about a peace keeping operation which is premised upon the agreement of various parties, particularly warring internal parties or neighbouring countries, then you need to be sure as you can be that that agreement will be sustained. And it also means that, in appropriate cases of peace enforcement and so on, you need to be sure that there is the right degree of external support to generally ensure that the operation will be able to carry through.
Thirdly, there has to be the necessary degree of resources to sustain the particular kind of intervention that is proposed. And fourthly, there must be a clear exit strategy - knowing when the whole character of the situation has changed, or whether the premise has changed for your involvement and when, accordingly, you need to either massively upgrade the nature of the operation or to simply say it's time to leave because it's impossible to achieve the goals originally set within the new circumstances as they exist.

You would be surprised at just how little attention systematically has been given even to criteria as basic as those that I have identified in a number of recent UN peace operations. Somalia and Yugoslavia are conspicuous among them. Rather than having clear and achievable goals, there have often been extremely ill-defined goals, with nobody having any conception as to whether they are achievable or not, it being a matter more of simply responding to the imperative of being seen to be doing something - to get in there, put some troops on the ground, have a visible commitment. Sometimes these things have to evolve, and can evolve, as we managed to evolve the peace keeping operation in Cambodia when the Khmer Rouge walked away from the process and changed the ground rules. But you would be surprised at the number of times that people don't just draw the necessary conclusions about the kind of resources that are required to sustain particular operations. In Yugoslavia, for example, there was a declaration of safe areas made on several occasions, but without any kind of willingness to accompany that by putting in the ground troops with the necessary enforcement mandate to ensure that a safe area would in fact be able to be maintained. Such issues as whether or not air strikes and so on would be available to support the safe area in question, were quite unresolved until very recently.

Finally, there is a question of the organisational reform necessary in the UN. In the very brief time available to deal with such a huge topic, I would summarise my emphasis in the book as the following seven areas of reform. First, it is a matter of restructuring the UN Secretariat itself so as to achieve, put simply, a more rational organisation than is the case at the moment. Flat management structures are all very well, but the trouble is that, in the UN, you have got the world's flattest management structure with some forty separate departments, offices, agencies, instrumentalities, commissions all reporting directly to the Secretary-General and his small cabinet of officers working with him. And as a result, all sorts of things get clogged and lost; coordination is very difficult; and you just don't have the people, short of the Secretary-General himself, with the kind of clout in the system to knock heads together and resolve a lot of the difficulties and complexities that arise in any organisation of this size.

Secondly, there is the obvious business of solving the UN funding problem. Overwhelmingly, that's a product of the United States not paying its dues. About a third of the outstanding debt on both regular assessment and peace keeping, now amounting to some $800-900 million, is that of the United States. This US Administration is very determined to overcome the problem, but there is a very real difficulty in being able to deliver that through Congress. Of course,
there are lots of other countries that are rather less conspicuously exposed but nonetheless are not playing their role.

We suggest other ways in which the funding issue might be addressed, but essentially none of them are nearly as
sensible as, just basically, people paying the dues they are supposed to.

Thirdly, I emphasise and discuss improving the management of peace operations in terms of headquarters general staff,
logistic support in New York and so on. Fourthly, I talk about an approach to organisational changes generally that
would give much greater priority to prevention rather than after-the-event peace operations of one kind or another. We
argue, fifthly, for a complete rethinking of the way in which humanitarian coordination is structured and applied in the
UN system, and how the various agencies off-line - such as WFP, UNHCR and FAO - should be coordinated and work
together.

Sixthly, we talk about raising the profile of peace building within the UN system - whether you are talking about
international regimes of one kind or another or in-country peace building programs by way of development assistance
or assistance to the development of better government. A lot of that is happening already within the UN system, but
without a particular peace building tag associated with it. We can get a better linkage or coordination between the
economic and social agenda of the UN and the more traditional peace and security agenda.

And finally, there is the question of restructuring the Security Council itself. Not that the Security Council is working
at all badly; on the contrary, it is working much better in the last few years than it has ever worked. But it is
increasingly losing its representative character, given the new shape of the world. The Security Council, and in turn the
members thereof, represent the post-World War II winners. They don't represent all the centres of present day world
power. And unless you ensure that the Council does achieve better representation of the developing countries at this
highest decision-making level, you are gradually, over time, going to erode, through eroding representativeness its
legitimacy.

If there is any single theme running through the book, it is the notion of cooperative security: it is the best available
terminology to encapsulate the most important themes that we are talking about here.

The notion of cooperative security embraces two rather more familiar themes in this sort of discourse: the theme of
common security and that of collective security. Common security is the concept that was given great momentum by
the Brandt Commission in the early 1980s. It is the notion that security between nations is best guaranteed by working
with each other rather than against each other - the idea of not so much building walls between countries and sheltering
behind them, but creating interdependence, very close working relationships, not only in the sense of military
cooperation and transparency but also in the sense of multiple contacts through economic, cultural and human relations


and the like. It is essentially an optimistic, forward-looking concept of doing our best to guarantee your security. This is an important theme running through particularly the peace building/preventive diplomacy dimensions of what we are saying here.

The other side of the coin is collective security. What that means is a system where members of a group combine together, to renounce force against each other by any one of them, but also agree that, in the event that any member of their group should start engaging in rogue behaviour, or should the group be threatened by an outsider, then they will act together to resist the common danger. That is essentially a military doctrine. It is one of the foundations, of course, of the UN itself. Chapter VII of the Charter is all about collective security, when nations of the world, acting together, agree to deal with that kind of misbehaviour through the Security Council in appropriate cases. And that is an important pessimistic side of the coin, if you like, as compared with common security, which is the optimistic side, trying to avoid these situations ever erupting. Collective security is premised on the assumption that sometimes they will erupt and you have got to do something about it.

I have described cooperative security in the book in these terms: "a broad approach to security which is multidimensional in scope and gradualist in temperament, which emphasises reassurance rather than deterrence, is inclusive rather than exclusive, is not restrictive in membership, favours multilateralism over bilateralism, does not privilege military solutions over non-military ones, assumes that states are the principal actors in the security system but accepts that non-state actors may have an important role to play, doesn't require the creation of formal security institutions but doesn't reject them either, and which, above all, stresses the value of creating habits of dialogue on a multilateral basis". A bit of a mouthful, maybe. But if we can get that kind of thinking going about the post-Cold War international peace and security environment, then I think we will have made a very big advance indeed.

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