INTERNATIONALISING AUSTRALIA

Address by Senator the Hon Gareth Evans QC, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Rotary Club of Melbourne, 18 May 1994

As Australia entered the 1980s, there were all sorts of signs that the "Lucky Country" was running out of luck. Agricultural markets, strong for most of our history, were under increasing stress with new kinds of export subsidies being granted by the United States and Europe, and long term price slides were evident in a number of key agricultural commodity areas. Our minerals and energy producers, which had sustained us in the 1960s and the 1970s after our traditional agricultural markets in Europe collapsed with the advent of the Common Market, faced stiff new competition in a number of other parts of the world. It was not at all clear that we would be able to rely on the luck of our resource endowment to see us through.

Even as we started to emerge from the recession of 1981-1983, inflation was inordinately high, business profitability inordinately low and business on-costs manifestly excessive. Most measures of our comparative overall economic capacity, including GDP tables, had us visibly declining. Internationally, we were gradually dissipating that respect which had been won for Australia by the far-reaching foreign policy moves of the Whitlam Government in the early 1970s, which - whatever you might have thought of them at the time - had certainly shaken us out of the lethargic dependancy syndrome which had characterised the conduct of Australian foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s. Overall, there was a feeling both here and abroad that Australia was a rather marginalised Anglo-Saxon outpost: a pleasant enough place in which to live and raise children, but gradually sinking into a fair degree of irrelevance, and facing a fairly inexorable long term decline, at least in comparison to other countries in the region and elsewhere in the world.

When the Labor Government came into office in 1983 the task we set ourselves was to try and reverse all that, to create some new luck for Australia, and to do so through nothing less than what I would describe as the internationalisation of Australia. There are three main dimensions to that
internationalisation we have been pursuing in the eleven years we have now been in government. First, there has been the internationalisation of domestic policy, to make ourselves competitive, not just in our traditional commodity markets, but in manufacturing and services as well - so as to be able to do better both against imports and, more particularly, in overseas markets, especially the rapidly burgeoning ones in our own Asian region.

Second, there has been the greater internationalisation of our external performance - so as to reposition ourselves, through our economic and political diplomacy, as significant players in the region and the world, seen and respected as such.

The third dimension of our internationalisation agenda was to internationalise our outlook, to change the way not only that people thought about us, but the way we `thought about ourselves as a nation, so that we became more comfortable and more confident when dealing with our own region and the world at large. In a business sense, this meant not only developing an export culture, but in particular an Asian export culture.

That was the agenda that we set for ourselves, and it became ever more clearly articulated as the decade wore on. Looking back over the decade, I think it is fair to say that we have been very successful on all three fronts, and that while we can never afford to be complacent about anything, we can now afford to be more confident about our future than we have, as a nation, been able to be for a very long time.

**Domestic Policy**

I don't need to spend a lot of time on the internationalisation of the domestic economy because you know what we have been going through over the last ten years. Some of it was painful; most of it was very difficult. But we did succeed in making ourselves lean and taut and competitive in all the areas that I mentioned, turning ourselves upside down and inside out economically in the process: by deregulating the financial system; assaulting systematically tariff walls and residual protectionist sentiment; restructuring quite fundamentally the tax system, in particular for business; corporatising and then privatising the major government business enterprises; creating real
competition in the transport, communications and electricity sectors (although nobody denies there are still further efficiency gains to be made in these sectors); and freeing up labour markets, in particular by encouraging enterprise and productivity bargaining.

And we have been doing all this in a context where we were simultaneously introducing all sorts of encouragements for business to behave more adventurously and creatively, in particular by going offshore. Thus we worked through the 1980s to develop a National Trade Strategy, bringing together the Commonwealth, the States, the industry associations and the unions, to coordinate our export and investment promotion, country by country and region by region. We fundamentally re-shaped the Australian Trade Commission (Austrade) to make it lean and sharply focused, much better geared than in the past to helping Australian exporters, particularly small to medium size exporters, and particularly in high value-added, high technology areas of manufacturing and services. We developed strategies and programs, like the International Trade Enhancement Scheme (ITES), which gives basically low interest loans to businesses to encourage them to expand their operations overseas and the Export Market Development Grants scheme (EMDG), which met the costs of businesses, under clearly defined criteria, in getting out and establishing bridgeheads offshore.

The results of that combination, of rigorous deregulatory discipline on the one hand together with encouragement programs on the other, have been spectacular. The record speaks for itself. We have increased our international competitiveness by something like 30 per cent over the last decade. We have reduced industrial disputes to their lowest level in 42 years. We have achieved the rates of growth right at the top of the OECD tables. We have brought inflation down to around 2 per cent and it looks like staying there. We have achieved the best conjuncture of economic fundamentals that the country has had for thirty years or more, and we believe that our Budget strategy will well and truly lock that in over the period ahead.

Moreover, that domestic economic performance has translated massively into improved export performance, and in particular, effective export performance in the East Asian marketplace where we now sell over 60 per cent of our exports. South East Asia eighteen months ago overtook Europe as our second
largest regional market after North East Asia. Most importantly of all, we have succeeded in making a fundamental, crucial structural shift in our export base - away from commodities towards, now, high growth, high value manufactures and services - which has seen us in the last year exporting for the first time more manufactures than we export rural products.

External Policy

Export performance of that kind doesn't just happen, doesn't just occur automatically, even with all the kinds of incentives that I have described. There is a need for a domestic policy support base of the kind that I have described. There is also a need for a change in psychology, and I'll come to that point in a moment. But there is also a need for something else as well - and that is a perception in the international marketplace that your country is a serious economic player in the international market system. Australia, in this sense, coming into the 1980s, had an emerging image problem. We were seen in many places as nothing much more than a farm, a quarry and a tourist beach - an easy-going, low-key, light-weight backwater. That kind of imagery has been very hard to shake off. And it is not very helpful imagery when you're dealing, for example, with governments abroad who are seeking tenders for huge infrastructure projects and have to make decisions at the margin as to which companies from which countries they are going to entrust these projects. And it is not very helpful when you are trying to break into markets at the level of highly sophisticated services or high technology, high value-added manufactured products: a country's "brand image", not only with governments but business and consumers as well, can mean a great deal in terms of your effectiveness in mounting that sort of penetration.

And that is what a lot of our diplomacy - our economic diplomacy and our political diplomacy - has been about through the 1980s. It has been about not just pursuing traditional security objectives and not just pursuing the traditional economic objectives of negotiating reductions in access barriers, country by country and multilaterally. Rather it has been about repositioning Australia, and generating new kinds of images of Australia, as a sophisticated, mature, independent, active and attractive player in the world's markets.

That diplomacy, to be successful - and I think so far it has been, although
there is always much more to be done - has to operate at three levels simultaneously, global, regional and bilateral.

Globally, we have to recognise our limitations. Australia is not a superpower and we are not a major power. We are very much just a middle power in terms of the kind of clout that we can exercise. We cannot rely on intimidating anyone into following a particular policy objective. We can only rely on the power of persuasion. We cannot do that across a wide front: we have to be selective in the sort of issues we run with. But we have had a number of successes on that wider global stage by doing just that. In the economic sphere, obviously we were very important players, central players in fact, through the whole course of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, not least through the role we played by establishing in 1986 the Cairns Group of like-minded agricultural trading nations, which positioned itself as very much an effective third force, arguing and fighting against many of the objectives and policies of the US on the one hand, and the Europeans on the other.

In the political and security areas of international global diplomacy we have had, again, our successes, by focusing on particular areas. For example, bringing to successful fruition the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention a year or so ago, after twenty years of fairly fruitless endeavour before, I think counts as an unequivocal success. What we are doing now on the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT) and the renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has made us one of the half-dozen or so most active and influential countries in terms of those policy objectives. That is also perhaps true in the whole area of UN reform, as we try to re-shape ideas about how the UN should carry out its pease and security role in the post-Cold War environment. The success of Cambodia, for example, stands as a demonstration of what can be done (and Cambodia does continue to be regarded around the world as a UN success, despite the lingering security and other problems with which the country is grappling). But the very problematic outcomes of Somalia and, even worse, Bosnia, are demonstrations of what can go wrong. We all hope that the UN can do something now to stop the horrifying carnage in Rwanda, but the difficulties of mounting with very limited resources a successful policing operation in a country racked by the hatreds of civil war can never be underestimated.
Bilaterally, it has been a matter of working very hard to build effective relationships with all the key countries in our own region, and also in many other parts of the world, given the increasing degree of interdependence of countries around the world. Not only in neighbourhood security terms, not only in trade terms, but also because of the political negotiations consistently conducted in multilateral forums like the UN, it is crucial that you have comfortable, effective working relations with all sorts of people.

The importance to us of countries like Japan, China and Indonesia speaks for itself. But there are many other countries where we have been working just as hard, e.g. Vietnam where our relationship was consolidated so well by the Prime Minister in his recent visit there. This was a function not of just six months worth of effort, but an effort which was sustained right through the 1980s. In the early days after 1983, Australia's recognition of the Vietnamese government, establishment of diplomatic relations and, ahead of the rest of the world, initiation of a development assistance program, made us very unpopular with a number of other countries in the region, but are very warmly remembered in Vietnam itself. And the relationship now, in terms of the very active involvement by many Australia companies, not least BHP, speaks for itself.

The centrepiece of our diplomacy in recent times has been regional diplomacy. The basic theme has been to build an Asia Pacific community - with a small 'c' at this stage, not as a European clone - in which Australia is seen unequivocally to be a part and partner, and not just standing outside with its nose pressed against the window like an urchin outside a tart shop. We want an Asia Pacific community in which we are active, engaged, visible, involved, and accepted players.

There has been two particular vehicles through which we have pursued that objective. On the political-security side, we have sought the creation of a regional security dialogue process. Our credentials to advocate that were very much enhanced by the success we had with our Cambodian diplomacy, particularly over the period 1989-1991 when the peace plan was being conceived and put in place. But beyond that, we have been seen as influential, perhaps a little more so than anyone else, in stimulating a new way of thinking about how we should approach security issues in the post-Cold War
era: cooperatively, through multilateral dialogue, rather than simply relying on the old group of bilateral alliance relationships which worked very successfully during the Cold War years, but which are much less relevant and resonant in the much more fluid environment we now confront.

On the economic side within our region, the institutional vehicle for movement has been APEC - the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation process - which we initiated in 1989 as a response to the stark realities of this part of the world, now accounting as it does for 40 per cent of world trade and 50 per cent of global production. It has been very important to develop cooperative strategies to take advantage of that, and move the regional economic game forward even faster, and more substantially, than might otherwise be the case.

APEC is still evolving, and has a long way to go, but with its membership of the 18 major trading economies of the region, its established economic cooperation agenda, its rapidly developing trade facilitation agenda, and its slowly emerging 'GATT-plus' trade liberalisation agenda, it is already firmly in place as the Asia Pacific's pre-eminent economic forum.

Consciousness

My last theme is the internationalisation, over the last few years, of Australian consciousness. In all of the areas I have mentioned - developing economic relationships, and developing more comfortable and confident political and security relationships, particularly in our own region - governments can only do so much. Only so much can grow out of good domestic policy; only so much can grow out of active, creative external policy. Ultimately, the activity itself, the drive and the achievement, has to be at the level of individual businesses and ordinary members of the community. For a long time through the 1980s, it did seem as though we were bashing our heads against a brick wall. I remember John Button, in speech after speech through the 1980s, talking about the need to develop an export culture in this country, to get businesses to think more positively about moving offshore, chancing their arm, trying it out, exploring the art of the possible. It took a long time for that to take hold, but I think that, particularly over the last five or six years, taken hold it has.
A key watershed in developing a sense of our own regional environment and our place in it was the immigration debate that we had in 1988. The misconceived attempt at that time to resurrect some semblance of an anti-Asian immigration policy was so comprehensively routed - not least within the conservative side of politics itself - that it represented, I think, the last twitch of the White Australia dinosaur. Over the subsequent period, there has been an absolute explosion of what I call "Asia-consciousness" : the development of a perception and understanding in the Australian community of the immediacy, the reality, and the relevance of our relationships with the countries of our own region.

That evidence is before your eyes daily in the contents of the media (or at least the classier end of the media). It is evident in the way in which schools are now full of kids studying Asian languages. It is evident in the way in which the cities and streets are full of Asian students and tourists, with the immigrant population of Asian origin expected to constitute fully 10 percent of the Australian population within a generation. It is evident in the fact that the business sector, by and large, is now falling over itself to analyse and understand and take up Asian market opportunities. It is evident in the fact that arts festivals, like the Adelaide Festival recently concluded, are now finding themselves with 50 percent or more of their events, functions and programs coming from Asia. It is evident in the fact that Labor won the last election with the whole theme of "Australia's engagement in Asia" being absolutely central to Paul Keating's campaign. The whole notion of Australia's future being inexorably bound up with the region in which we live has now unquestionably become part of not just the Australian political consciousness, but of Australian community consciousness.

Let me conclude by saying this: it is a very exciting time to be Australian. For the first time in our history as a nation, we really are right at the heart of one of the centres of world activity, certainly world economic activity and, in all sorts of other ways, political and diplomatic activity. Australia is increasingly being seen, regionally and internationally, in the way in which we want to be seen: as a modern, innovative, socially and economically advanced multicultural society which takes an independent line in pursuing our national interests, but is willing to work cooperatively with others. This will open up even greater opportunities for us to build partnerships and arrangements
which allow us to create a more peaceful and prosperous region and a more humane and interdependent world.

Not the least of these partnerships will be economic. As some of us have said so often, the "tyranny of distance" which used to haunt us so much as a nation, has now become the "advantage of proximity". Of course we need more jobs in this country, but the perception has very rapidly taken hold that the growth that is necessary to produce those jobs is there for the taking in increased exports; and that increased exports are there for the taking right on our own doorstep in the Asian marketplace. So the message, if any is needed, for the many representatives of the business community that are here today, is simply this: if you haven't already got with the export game, if you haven't already embraced the potential that is there - and it still is the case that only some 10 percent of Australian manufacturers have, and even fewer service providers - then it's time to do just that. You will be doing yourselves a very considerable service in terms of the vitality and profitability of your own enterprises. And in terms of the jobs you will be creating, you will be doing your fellow Australians a very considerable service as well.

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