THE USE OF FORCE IN PEACE OPERATIONS

TRANSCRIPT OF KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY SENATOR GARETH EVANS TO THE STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI) AND AUSTRALIAN DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE SEMINAR, STOCKHOLM, 10 APRIL 1995

Let me right at the outset add to this night of self-congratulation and thanks by thanking SIPRI for its efforts in bringing this occasion together and thank you to all of you around the table for taking the time and the trouble to be here. It is a very distinguished gathering. Of course the proof of its success will not be so much getting us here, but what comes out of this meeting over the next couple of days.

We're all aware that the UN is currently afflicted by something of a crisis of confidence insofar as its security role is concerned. Expectations were raised quite dramatically by the end of the cold war. Those expectations were reinforced by the success of the Gulf War operation and "expanded" peacekeeping efforts in Cambodia and elsewhere. But then those expectations were dashed by the failure, or the perceived failure, however untrue or one dimensional that perception might be. The perceived failure of the UN operations, in particular in Somalia, in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. The kinds of images which have been so omnipresent over the last year or so; that of the kids killed by a sniper in Sarajavo, with a couple of blue helmets standing over him looking distraught, disbelieving, helpless; the pictorial images of the evacuation of Somalia with troops firing back in their evacuation on the people who they had come not many months earlier to help. Those images have been haunting and they die hard. They are an image of an organisation which is not meeting its goals, not meeting the expectations, whether exaggerated or not, that people have of it. Those images are really all about force: about either too much force or too little force; force not being there when it mattered; or force being exercised in what's been seen to be the wrong place at the wrong time. I think there is a particular responsibility on people like us who, I guess by definition, do care about these issues and care about the role of the United Nations - to try and untangle some of the issues
with which the international community and the UN are now confronted; try to untangle the concepts to the extent that we have not completely succeeded in doing so so far; and untangling and defining the practical implications that flow from those concepts. I think there is a tremendous body of experience around this table to tackle the job - experience in negotiating political agreements and negotiating more precise mandates in decision making as Commanders in the field, and as well as of course analysing and try to deal on a more general level with the nature of the problems thrown up by all these issues. And I certainly hope we can productively utilise this expertise today.

The nature of the problem with which this seminar is dealing can fairly briskly be stated. It's all to do really with the grey area, or the twilight zone, falling between those two schools of Chapter VII on the one hand which clearly authorises force, and Chapter VI which doesn't authorise the use of military force in terms. The charter, as we all know, does explicitly mandate the use of military force in Chapter VII, Article 42, of which the first of that happening in response to any threat to the peace breach of the peace or act of aggression when the Security Council considers that lesser measures have been, or would be, inadequate. Before 1990 in the whole 45 year history of the UN, that provision was really only called upon twice. The first in Korea in 1950, in an operation in which the UN authorised, but did not itself command; and then again in 1960 in the Congo when in an exercise growing out of an initial Chapter VI operational mandate the UN did command that Blue Helmets in what was pretty much a full scale exercise in the use of force. Twice in 45 years up till 1990 has been followed however, as we all know, since 1990 by a rapid succession of further utilisations of the Chapter VII mandate in large or small part. In five separate parts of the globe we've had operations being mounted in reliance on that authority. In the former Yugoslavia, first with UNPROFOR, then much more recently in the last few days with UNCRO, both adding or involving the addition of Chapter VII components to what were at the outset, or I guess primarily Chapter VI operations. In Somalia you had the UNITAF exercise, first of all with the UN authorising a Chapter VII operation being taken by others a unified task force, but then being followed by UNOSOM itself, the mixed Chapter VI and Chapter VII operation. In Rwanda we had the use of force being authorised by the French Operation Turquoise; in Haiti being authorised for the US-led operation 'Restore Democracy'; both of those giving way fairly rapidly to
more familiar and lesser, in terms of their mandate, Chapter VI operation. So you had this rapid escalation in five separate locations, more than that in terms of separate operations, in these different parts of the globe. The rapid multiplication of activity, but not let's face it, a rapid multiplication of success flowing from that activity. Probably the most dramatically and visibly unsuccessful operation, and I say this with all due respect to poor old Admiral Howe who I find to my disconcertment in our midst today, particularly since in the written version of this paper I refer among other things to the tragic farce of that operation in pursuit of General Aideed. That's a much referred to Admiral Howe himself who was caught in a rather unhappy pincer operation between Boutros Ghali on the one hand, and the Pentagon on the other. But whatever the circumstances of that we will no doubt be talking about it later on. I think it was sort of my idea in many ways of what we are talking about in terms of the perceived success, and certainly the problems flowing from that continue to haunt us. But that's on the Chapter VII side and we know what's been happening.

On Chapter VI, going back to basics, we do have here a very well established tradition of military operations where the non-use of force, except in self-defence which I will come back to in a moment, is, has been perceived, as an absolute integral part of the equation. The traditional essence, peace keeping UN style, has involved the monitoring, the supervision, the verification, of agreements reached between parties to conflicts. Agreements themselves were brokered usually as a result of diplomatic peace making exercises of one kind or another. These operations squarely relying for their authority on Chapter VI of the UN Charter about the specific settlement of disputes. If you are looking for more precise authorisation, you can find it in Article 3 which refers to a number of specific peaceful means, and then has the catch-all phrase at the end about other peaceful means. But I think peace keeping can clearly be seen as another peaceful means within the terms of Article 33. Conceptually, Dag Hammarskjold got things awfully muddled right at the outset, or got such a congeneration, that analysts thought were muddled by referring to peace keeping right at the beginning as a Chapter VI 1/2 kind of a proposition. I think however, "traditional" peace keeping should be seen as absolutely clearly and straight-forwardly mandated by Chapter VI itself. If we are going to use Chapter VI 1/2 terminology, let's keep it for the more twilight zone or grey area activities which we will come to in a moment. Although even there
as you will hear, I don't really think at the end of the day it's helpful to use that terminology even in that context. There are several reasons why the non-use of force was seen from the outset as an absolutely integral part of the concept and application of peacekeeping. Four reasons in particular. First, the question of Charter authority which I have just stated. There is certainly no explicit authority which you can find, or implicit authority, in Chapter VI to enable Commanders in the field or anyone else to take other than peaceful measures albeit using military personnel. The Charter authority itself is the most obvious reason. Secondly, the whole concept of peacekeeping in its original resolution was premised on the consent of the parties, and the parties reliance in turn on an impartial neutral United Nations to monitor, supervise, verify. To do non-forceful things, but nonetheless important things, in the implementation of their agreements. Thirdly, it's really a variation on the last point. The recognition that peacekeeping operations do have a quintessentially political objective to ensure a sustainable peace, to supplement, to reinforce, the diplomatic process of peace making - getting the parties together, producing the agreements. Peacekeeping is seen as simply a supplement to that with the motion being I guess that any use of force would be incompatible with that confidence building political, essentially political, process. The fourth reason why the non-use of force was for the outset regarded as integral to peacekeeping was simply the response of troop contributing countries who did contribute their personnel on the assumption that these were low level risk operations. There is no perception that peacekeeping operations would other than incidentally involve their personnel in the kind of exposure to risk which is so problematic in terms of domestic political constituencies and I think perceived that way, peacekeeping evolved in the way in which we come to know it. That system worked, I guess, well enough until the late 1980s, the end of the Cold War. Since then we have seen, as so many commentators have remarked, the nature of the conflicts with which the international community is confronted really quite strikingly changing; becoming much more intra-state than interstate in character. This progress has been well charted in the SIPRI Year Books, the 1994 Year Book for example telling us that of the 34 major armed conflicts occurring around the globe in 1993, every single one of those conflicts was intra-state in character. Intra-state conflicts seem inevitably to involve very messy situations even when a peace is brokered, and the role of the UN, the role of peacekeeping operations in support of achieving a sustainable peace in those
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Environments has become very much more complicated than the role traditionally associated with peace keeping operations. Simply, as I said, monitoring, supervising, verifying agreements, ceasefire lines and so on, agreed between warring parties. Now you get rapidly into the business of what is known, as we all know, in the trade now as 'expanded' peace keeping operations with the peace keepers being thrust willy nilly into elections organisation, civil administration including law and justice matters, human rights protection, refugee repatriation, the beginnings of major economic development activity. All mixed up, becoming part of a peace keeping operation. But as the nature of the situations with which peace keepers dealing has changed, as the nature of the operations themselves have become so much more complex - you are familiar with the mandates in Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique and elsewhere - the distinction is really very stark between the mandates of earlier years. As all this has happened the dangers for peace keepers within these situations have increased rapidly and again if you use as a crude measure the number of deaths of UN personnel engaged in these sorts of operations, leaving aside for this purpose the statistics from the Korean War and the Gulf War which were full-scale of course Chapter VII war fighting operations, and in any event not strictly involving Blue Helmets, but rather simply UN authorised operations, leaving those big conflicts to one side, and straight peace keeping or the more ambiguous mixed, or Chapter VI and Chapter VII operations, up until 1988 you have a total of 754 people dying and 234 of them in just one operation alone in the Congo. But since 1988, we have already had 528 deaths just in the last VII years with 293 of those in Somalia and the Former Yugoslavia alone. So its very obvious that the scale of the risk has been increasing. Though at the same time a number of fairly obvious constraints on the effectiveness of the UN system have been emerging. The limited capacity in the UN Secretariat, a handle with demands being placed upon, it is pretty self-evident that will all the will and all the capacity in the world, it is just extraordinarily difficult to be expecting the Secretariat as presently resourced to be handling as it is at the moment some Chapter VII simultaneous peace keeping or mixed operations. You have come up against the phenomenon - we have all seen it now - the limited willingness by troop contributing countries now to supply personnel. 70-80,000 personnel in total seems to be about the maximum that countries are now prepared to commit at any one time and we are running into a further new problem now with the United States' reluctance to keep paying in accordance with the old
peace keeping formula. And the financial pressure that's going to add to all other pressures at work at the moment don't make for a very happy outlook so far as availability of personnel is concerned. Then of course you've got, coming back to the area that is going to preoccupy us today, you've got increasing anxiety all around the place about the mismatch between the kind of mandates that are being given to peace operations and the resources to accompany those mandates. The continuing problem with the situation in Yugoslavia still I think being the best demonstration of this problem at work. Still primarily a peace keeping operation in its basic character, certainly in terms of the resources that have been made available to it, but a peace keeping operation still without anything seriously in the nature of a peace to keep, but being supplemented by a peace enforcement mandate with support from operations but without, in almost any view, the necessary resources of personnel being made available to Commanders on the ground to enable enforcement operations to properly succeed. So that is the current constraints, the problems that we are all seeing.

The two kinds of issues, of reasons, of coming to this twilight zone, or grey zone, between the simplest Chapter VI operations and the most blood thirsty Chapter VII operations, and that twilight zone has two basic dimensions to it. One concerns the reach of the Chapter VI mandate. How far does the concept of self-defence actually stretch? And in particular, how far can, and should, a Chapter VI operation go in the so-called defence of the mission, as distinct from the very immediate self-defence situation responding to an armed attack, how far can you go in defence of mission and still be perceived to be a Chapter VI operation so far as the use of force is concerned.

And then the other part of the question. What kind of a mandate, and what kind of resources to go with that mandate, do UN operations need to have to deal with a whole variety of particular situations that we have to confront? In particular protecting humanitarian relief operations in situations where you can reasonably anticipate violence as either the norm or an occurring phenomenon. What kind of a mandate - do you need a specific Chapter VII mandate to reach out and give yourself the capacity to deal with that, and if so what kind - for protecting humanitarian relief operations. Secondly for protecting peace keepers under threat from those who never really consented in the first place, or who have breached whatever form of consent or
agreement there might have been evident at the outset. And thirdly, what kind of role, mandate, is necessary, if any, to deal with protecting against life threatening human rights violations. I'm not talking here about violations against UN personnel themselves - that takes you back into self-defence or protection of peace keepers under threat - but protecting against human rights violations, perpetrated by one or other party against civilians or whatever in the country you are dealing with. And there you have the basic situations that cause us all problems.

Back to Chapter VI, self-defence, defence of mission, the legitimacy of pure self-defence responses, was of course accepted almost from the outset. It may not have been accepted really right back at the beginning in 1948 when the first peace keeping operation in UNTSO where you had Ralphe Bunche insisting that the monitors there, the peace keepers, shouldn't carry arms at all. But certainly by 1956 in the post-Suez situation in UNEF I you have Dag Hammarskjold frankly and articulately spelling out the self-defence role. The real problem I guess since then has been as to what actually constitutes minimum force, proportionate response - no doubt that question will be addressed by people dealing with this topic later on - ROEs become absolutely crucial here in defining the nature of the legitimate response, but of course ROEs here as elsewhere are simply a basis for intelligent judgement, not a substitute for it. And the questions of training, questions of guidance, questions as to how people react in particular situations - and there will be discussion shortly about that by people much more expert than I later today to identify the issues there - the defensive mission situation is a much more problematic one than the one about self-defence as such. If you are going to start talking about permissible use of force in defence of mission without needing anything more than the basic Chapter VI mandate to do it, it is obviously very important to find agreement about the area which is here an issue. What does the mission for this purpose itself entail? Is the mission essentially a physical concept? Does it include all personnel? Does the mission extend to all associated personnel such as staff of other UN agencies, NGO relief staff? Perhaps here there is some assistance to be derived from the debate during the negotiations on the new Protection of UN Personnel convention. Again you need to untangle here, if you are going to address this issue seriously, whether force is justified to, if at all, defend only the basic goals of the mission, or whether it is something wider than that. Cambodia
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gives us, here as elsewhere, many good examples. Would use of force for
eexample to protect electoral centres in Cambodia which were manned largely
by international polling station officers, the International Polling Station
Officers (IPSOs), who weren't themselves UN personnel and who were off to
one side of the mainstream UN operation. Would that be regarded as part of
the basic mission? Probably yes, I guess, given that the basic purpose of
UNTAC was to create the environment, to make possible, the holding of free
and fair elections. But if force is to be justified, how much force? In what
context? Is it force whenever the credibility of the mission is somehow at risk
or when it is only in situation of some immediate physical danger which takes
you back into self-defence territory? Is there any, at the end of the day, is
there any content left to the notion that defence of the mission which is not
picked up on the one hand either by properly understood concept of self-
defence; or which on the other hand is better left to a discussion about
extended justifications for the use of force, the add-on issue which I now
come to. That's the question I think we need to address here, or one of the
questions, the central question.

When one comes to the so-called add-on issues, the nature of the mandate
that's necessary to deal with humanitarian relief, the protection of peace
keepers under threat, and in the broader sense of that expression, in protecting
human rights. Again, there is lots I could say about all of this, but I don't want
to anticipate too much of the discussion.

Insofar as humanitarian relief operations are concerned, I guess humanitarian
intervention of the kind we are talking about here, the kind that raises
problems, has to be regarded as essentially involving a Chapter VII action
because what we are talking about here is a lack of consent by some, or all
parties, to the UN's relief presence. There is still not much in the way of
visible international consensus about whether or not these sorts of operations
are legitimate or internal, the internal conflict situations crying out for
attention, the UN has just got on with the job of doing it on occasions without
troubling too much about the conceptual rationale for this in terms of
international security definitional issues. But to the extent that it's done at all,
it does seem, in my judgement anyway, to pretty clearly require something in
the nature of an explicitly self-understood Chapter VII mandate. The big
problem about this kind of mandate is not so much whether it's a pure
humanitarian relief operation with no other elements of "traditional" peace keeping involved - the problem much more often arises, conceptual and practical problem, when one is adding a humanitarian relief delivery function to what is primarily conceived of as a peace keeping operation. And the problem arises when the UN forces have to become essentially a party to the dispute, have to take sides, have to take on physically either one or other of the contending groups in order to do their relief assistance job. And this is the kind of problem that is confronted of course in Somalia and elsewhere, and one of the things that made the carrying through of that operation just so difficult. I don't think there is any easy answer to the dilemmas confronted by Commanders on the ground in these situations where we all tell them, so far as possible, to avoid the use of force, to try and negotiate their way through roadblocks and other forms of construction so as not to make your ultimate political task harder, but in practice that's weighed against the job of actually getting the relief through, and the necessity on occasions to grievously wound or defend somebody in the process. And I have got no instant solution - that is one of the purposes of this discussion of course, to try to pick a way through that.

So far as protecting peace keepers under threat are concerned, again the number of the more recent Chapter VII operations have been examples of mandates created for this purpose, particularly as we all know in the former Yugoslavia, and I think it has been accepted that it's pretty difficult to place responsibility on field Commanders to interpret Chapter VI type mandates loosely or widely enough to enable them to in fact use force when this was clearly not the original intention. And it has been recognised that if it is anticipated that force is going to have to be used to protect the larger operation, then there ought to be some explicit mandate created for that purpose. And thus it is that we have seen this litter of Chapter VII mandates, piecemeal mandates, in the Bosnian and other Yugoslavian contexts.

Once that mandate has been established, of course that's only the beginning rather than the end of the story because you confront all the well familiar dilemmas, the ROEs can be written with a great deal of precision to protect the peace keepers under threat and various envisageable situations, but at the end of the day, particularly if you are dealing with a mixed mandate or situation, not the kind of Korean War or Gulf War 'get out and get em'
environment, but the more ambiguous one where you still try to pursue a political objective at the end of the day, then how that mandate is in fact applied in practice circumspectly trying to avoid publication and so on so as to retain as much consent and cooperation from the parties as possible, is obviously a very difficult business. It's often been said that perhaps the most effective form of protection of peace keepers in these situations is simply to deploy sufficient numbers to deter any attacks rather than actually having to depend upon using force to deal with an actual attack.

But of course any deterrent step of this kind to remain plausible has to be backed by a credible threat of actual punitive reaction in the event that a deliberate attack were ever made. And it's that problem of moving from the deployment itself to the credible threat of punitive reaction that has been the problem in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. Again I don't think there is any easy or glib answers that I've got to offer to these dilemmas it's again one of the points of today's and tomorrow's seminar to try and tease out some of these issues in a bit more precision rather than is the case at the moment. So far as protecting human rights is concerned, again talking here about civilian human rights, not the human rights of the peace keepers themselves. It does seem to be becoming increasingly accepted that even in the absence of some kind of formal Chapter VII mandate, peace keepers that are present when a serious life threatening violation of human rights is occurring, or is about to occur, that they do have a duty if they can realistically do something to stop it, not to stand idly by. I don't know whether there is a theory on this that has ever been properly articulated by anybody, but we certainly take the view, so far as our own armed forces are concerned in these situations, that we would expect them to play that role if they are out there by themselves just on their own flag and being under the UN flag doesn't make any basic difference in that respect.

There is a difference though between acting to prevent atrocities imminently about to occur in your presence when you can do something about it on the question of how you react after such incidents have occurred in the cooler light of the day, and this has been a very difficult problem of course for Commanders in the field as it has been for those framing political instructions in New York, because punitive action after the event will almost always be seen as taking sides, with consequences, particularly in these mixed mandate
situations, where you've got a political objective at end of the day, where the consequences for the underlying acceptance of the UN operation, the parties faith in the UN system, and it does seem to be the case that in the absence of some explicit Chapter VII mandate peace keepers do have no general right of arrest, no method of detention, no court of law to refer violators to. The absence of mandates of this kind was one of the inhibiting factors for the UNTAC operation as Lt General Sanderson will no doubt tell you about. And the kind of pressure that was upon him and the UN force to go after the Khmer Rouge, some of their more vicious atrocities during the UNTAC period, that the pressure was immense. The temptation to do so was obviously also immense, but the knowledge was that such action would almost certainly do larger mission and so it didn't happen.

That's led us of course in another direction to place some emphasis on the desirability of so-called "justice packages" being part of any of these complex peace keeping mandates in the future. We can't, I think, in a broken state situation like Cambodia and Somalia just go in there without making some provision for dealing with the law and justice side of things - police operations, courts, prisons and all the rest, and that's another story that also needs to be picked up.

A further complication in this area arises in terms of war crimes legislation, war crimes tribunal. We have now got those in place - one in the former Yugoslavia - but if you want your peace keepers on the ground to be playing the role of providing security for witnesses or whatever, you are again thrusting them into the taking sides of business, I guess, from one point of view anyway, and that does create problems for the viability of the larger mission. So there is a whole heap of problems of that kind which continue to plague us in that area and which is again the purpose of this seminar to try and tease out.

So what conclusions would I at least want to draw about some of these conceptual issues and the practical things flowing from them. Let me spell out just three perhaps as a basis for discussion.

Conclusion number 1 in my mind is the crucial importance of keeping the conceptual distinctions clear. It does seem to me that whether you are talking
in principle, whether you are talking in practice about the implications for Commanders on the ground, or whether you are talking in practice about the political support for these operations, it is absolutely necessary to continue to draw a distinction between Chapter VI operations, promised on and consent and where the only force really anticipated is self-defence in a very narrowly defined context on the one hand; and Chapter VII operations on the other, where the possibility of using force to secure wider objectives is conceded from the outset. It does seem to me that there is just a fundamental distinction which you can't get over between Chapter VI and Chapter VII in that respect. As I have said at the outset I don't think there is rationally any such thing as a Chapter VI 1/2 operation. If you need a Chapter VII mandate for the whole of the mission, or for some particular identified finite part of it, then you should have it as a specifically identified, identifiably, Chapter VII mandate. Now it is true that Chapter VII operations cover an enormously wide spectrum of actual activity, or potential activity, from full-scale war fighting of unequivocal, unambiguous Korean, Gulf War kind on the one hand, to on the other hand, ad hoc responses limited to challenges to the authority of the mission, on the other hand. Now there are some around this table, and Mr Brad Hayes with Mr and his is one of them, and I know there are others as well, would argue that this distinction is really so important between different elements of the Chapter VII spectrum that you ought really not to talk about Chapter VII enforcement operations in one breath at all. You ought to make a distinction between enforcement operations, properly so-called, where you are actually imposing mandate terms on unwarring identified malappractors; where on the other hand, what you are doing to use Mr Hayes's terminology, is engaging an inducement exercise where the object is to, at the end of the day, seek consent without having to make recourse to widespread and sustained combat operation. Well obviously that's a distinction that we can all understand. The question is, I guess though, is how useful is that distinction in terms of the basic decision making, politically and militarily, that we have got to engage in. It does seem to me that the distinction at the end of the day, while useful, is more semantic than real, because in both cases, where there is the full blood dripping from the bayonets and the teeth of the warriors war fighting mandate on the one hand, or whether it's the ad hoc reaction mandate on the other, you simply still have to contemplate, in either case, the worst case situation and you have to draft the mandate to deal with the worst case situation, and crucially, you have to supply resources to deal with the worst
case situation accordingly. And others are again better equipped to talk about these things than I am, but it does seem to me that even in the case of full-scale war fighting enforcement mandates, which you will really only want in here to pursue that mandate as far as is necessary to seek compliance with the basic objective, which is to stop the conflict and resume a situation of sustainable peace, and that underlying objective runs through the more ad hoc use of Chapter VII. Anyway, this is an issue which will be the subject I know of lively debate over the next two days, as to whether there are differences of this kind and if so, how meaningful they are, and I an nailing my colours to the mast that it is important to keep these conceptual distinctions clear and they are basically clear, even though you can clearly identify some internal further divisions and it's useful to have that discussion. At the end of the day, when it matters, it's important to keep them apart, VI and VII.

The second conclusion I would draw is how important it is for peace keeping operations to have appropriate quality resources. An appropriately clear political backing for them. General Sanderson has talked on various occasions about peace keepers being instruments of diplomacy, not of war, and I think just the intelligent approach to peace keeping operations with or without Chapter VII add on, is an approach which says that you have got to have at least as much regard to the politics of these operations and the political sensitivities of those who are caught up in them and you have to accordingly run them as you do the military dimensions of it. And again looking at some of the notes that have been prepared for discussions in particular contexts later on, it's obvious that some of the people who have been the most successful Commanders on the ground for peace keeping operations have been those who have been acutely conscious of the political dimension of the task and have had sympathetic and sensitive support in the implementation of that task from headquarters.

The third and final conclusion goes to the quantum of resources, not just the quality, to ensure that your peace enforcement mandates are accompanied by the kinds of resources, physical resources, that are necessary to do the job properly. And that applies right at the beginning of operations. Don't for God sake create peace keeping operations when you know that you are going to almost certainly have to deal from day one with non-compliance problems, with real problems of protecting peace keepers; don't move people into that
situation without resourcing them in terms of a mandate and the physical resources to go with it appropriately; and don't add Chapter VII responsibilities down the line; don't get yourself involved in these environments without adding the kinds of resources that are necessary to go with that. Some of the statistics are really pretty hair-raising in this respect when one remembers that when the Security Council in Bonsnia was trying to determine the additional force necessary to protect the safe havens, the force Commander recommended 30,000 personnel. This was reduced to 15,000 on the Secretariat's advice to the Security Council after the P3 jumped up and down about the costs involved. The Security Council's final approval you will remember was for a force of 7,500, and that story has been repeated elsewhere (which was not given in New York, right) but even the original mandate was only 7 1/2 as against a perceived need of much more than that.

The whole question of using mandated force more effectively is something I've spelt out at nauseus length in the written version of this paper and I won't trouble you with, because its running out of time, although the particular question does here arise of rapid reaction capability and how we cope with this particular problem that we are all familiar with and is the subject of so much debate at the moment. But again to nail my colours to the mast on this one, I guess like many people around this table, I have been through about 360 degrees of positions, in fact I am now going around the circle again, in trying to work out how best to deal with this. I initially took the view that however desirable it might be in principle, it simply wouldn't work in practice to have a volunteer force and that maybe it should be devoted to simply standby arrangements of some degree of workability. The situation as it unfolded in Rwanda gave me cause for thought again about that all over again and I certainly took the view, as others since have, in the Netherlands and Canada and elsewhere where there is so much activity currently occurring, that this is an issue that needs to be revisited in a major way. As I think about it even further now I am a bit inclined to come down on the side of some of those who are............all over again. but whichever you turn on this, it's going to be almost impossible to gather the political support for either a volunteer force, or even more difficult, a sort of a Gurkha-type quasi mercenary force, however useful that would be in practice. And with all the practical issues of working out how big it is, has to be, and how you fund it and so on, are going to cut across that and probably the best thing to do at the moment is to focus
very hard once and for all on getting the headquarters function sorted out in New York so that you have a credible general staff capacity at the strategic level, and at operational planning level you've got a rapidly deplorable headquarters component that can form the nucleus of new actions as they are mandated on the ground, and if you have an outfit like this working as well as it could, with the resources around the world, maybe you'd recapture the confidence of troop contributing countries to the extent where they would be much better at responding to requests for earmarking of standby forces and then actually responding to requests for those forces than they are at the moment.

Well that's where I am at the moment, and as no doubt with others here, I think you will evolve another few turn of the compass before the day or the week is over. What's clear is that there is a problem. What's not clear is how best to address the problem.

Just finally then, last of all, let me just re-emphasise the virtues of clarity in terms of trying to get the concepts right, get the mandates right, and to work out what the resources are that are necessary to go with those mandates. That more than anything else is what I was seeking to do when I wrote this thing back in 1993. A lot of the stuff in there seems a bit passe now because we've all worked our way through those dilemmas and have moved on and there is a new set of rather more complex dilemmas of the kind I have been describing today. But the basic message remains the same. You've just got to have a clear conceptual and legal framework. Not for the benefit of the academically tidy minded, but for the benefit of all those who have to wrestle with command and control questions, resource implications, the whole business of making this work politically and on the ground. And what we do in seminars like this wrestling with these concepts and what flows from them, really is of much more than merely academic importance. The lives of a great many people I fear are hanging on the kinds of deliberations we are engaged in over the next couple of days; what comes out of them; and I think, last word of all, the important thing in these discussions is to move as quickly as we can in a very generalised analysis, in a very generalised prescription to specific practically useful proposals for decision and for action. I am certainly very much looking forward to a discussion on these matters from this group of highly experienced and expert people, and I certainly hope that coming out of this
seminar we will have some practical and specific conclusions which will make a real difference to the quality of life to a hell of a lot of people around the globe at the moment who badly need the continuing commitment of the international community on their behalf.

Thank You